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Technological latecomer countries face a dilemma,they need to pursue pro-active 
industrial policies to compensate for manifold disadvantages vis-à-vis established 
competitors, but at the same time, due to neopatrimonial politics and capacity 
constraints, their institutions are rarely in a position to correct market failure effectively. 
Do the risks of misallocation outweigh the benefits and should these countries abstain 
from industrial policies? Country studies show that selective industry support is indeed 
frequently used as a source of patronage and clientelism, and implementation is often 
ineffective. Two of the surveyed countries—Tunisia and Ethiopia—with neopatrimonial 
traits nevertheless pursue ambitious agendas of industrial modernization and implement 
them fairly effectively. Scarcity of fossil energy and mineral resources, the need to build 
legitimacy on increasing social welfare, and committed leadership distinguish them 
from worse performers. 
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1 Introduction 
Technological latecomer countries suffer from more pervasive market failure than early 
industrialized countries. Their business environments lack most of the cluster synergies 
that more advanced locations offer. Sectorally targeted industrial policies are needed to 
overcome these disadvantages and create the preconditions for economic diversification 
and technological development. Industrial policies, however, affect the productivity of 
economic activities and thus create rents and, consequently, incentives for political 
capture. The development challenge is to manage rent creation in a way that maximizes 
public welfare and keeps political capture to the minimum. Yet, this is difficult when 
the ruling elites employ patronage and political clientelism systematically to create and 
preserve their legitimacy. This is the core of neopatrimonialism, a common 
characteristic of most developing countries. Industrial policies in particular can easily be 
employed to gain political support from specific constituencies, given that the criteria 
for establishing which activities merit protection and subsidies, and which ones do not, 
can be interpreted creatively.  
Hence, latecomer countries face a dilemma. They need industrial policies more urgently 
than mature economies do, but they are also the most likely candidates for political 
capture. This section explores the practical implications of this problem. Do the risks of 
misallocation outweigh the benefits of correcting market failure? Should these countries 
confinetheir economic policies to sector-neutral measures for improving their 
investment climates, or can industrial policy work under neopatrimonial rule? 
The first section carves out why technological latecomer countries suffer from more 
pervasive market failure than early industrialized countries, and which particular 
problems call for industrial policy solutions. It argues that, even when industrial policies 
are needed, governments may have insufficient capabilities and inappropriate incentives 
for implementing them efficiently. Neopatrimonialism is then introduced as a concept to 
explain the behaviour of interest groups in industrial development. We argue that 
neopatrimonialism greatly enhances the risks of political capture, but we also highlight 
the fact that some countries with strong neopatrimonial traits have made extraordinary 
economic progress. Section 2 provides empirical evidence of industrial policy-making 
in four Sub-Saharan African (SSA) and three countries in the Middle-East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. It shows that neopatrimonialism is indeed pervasive in these 
countries and affects the way industrial policies are designed and implemented. Overall, 
industrial policy effectiveness is fairly weak, although some programmes succeeded in 
developing new activities. Ethiopia and Tunisia stand out for pursuing long-term 
strategies of industrial transformation and implementing them fairly effectively, and are 
therefore described in greater detail. The concluding third section then draws general 
conclusions about industrial policy under neopatrimonial rule and discusses why the 
policy performance varies so significantly among the countries. 
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2  Theoretical considerations: industrial policy, latecomer development, and 
neopatrimonialism 
2.1  The case for industrial policy in latecomer countries  
Developing countries are latecomers to industrial development and other forms of 
knowledge-based production. In a globalizing world, their economies have to compete 
with others that initiated their industrial development decades or even centuries earlier. 
Catching up with the frontrunners becomes more and more difficult, because products 
and processes turn out to be increasingly complex and dependent on complementary 
assets provided by other companies and institutions. Early industrializing countries have 
been able to create many of these assets through a cumulative process of business 
specialization and sophistication of supporting institutions. Their firms can thus build on 
a range of network externalities that give them a substantial competitive edge over 
isolated newcomers in other locations. This makes it very difficult for the latter to 
compete in any kind of tradable goods—not only in export markets, but also at home, 
given that international investors and traders are penetrating their domestic markets. 
Referring to Africa, Collier and Venables (2007: 1)illustrate the disadvantages of 
latecomer development in the following way:  
Africa has lagged behind partly because its economic reforms lagged 
those of Asia. When export diversification started to boom in Asia in the 
1980s, no mainland African country provided a comparable investment 
climate. Now a number of African cities … offer reasonable investment 
climates, but they cannot compete with Asian cities that have comparable 
investment climates since the Asian cities have established clusters of 
firms in the new export sectors. Such clusters provide firms in the cluster 
with the advantages of shared knowledge, availability of specialist inputs 
and a developing pool of experienced labour. …Until African cities can 
establish such clusters, firms located in Africa face costs that will be 
above those of Asian competitors, but because costs are currently higher 
individual firms have no incentive to relocate.  
The larger the gap vis-à-vis more advanced countries, the more difficult it is to build 
competitive industries. Of course, poor countries may build on comparative advantages 
in natural resource endowments and/or low wages, but industrial upgrading towards 
more productive and profitable activities is not easy. In low-cost manufacturing it is 
difficult to compete against China and other established (mainly Asian) export locations 
that benefit from economies of scale and network synergies cum low wages, and growth 
paths built on exports of natural resources imply a range of well documented economic 
and political challenges.1 Latecomers thus face a number of competitive disadvantages 
which can hardly be overcome without pro-active government action. Low-income 
countries in particular suffer from severe market failure, as the following three 
examples illustrate:  
First,  coordination failure is far more frequent than it is in mature economies. 
Coordination failure occurs when market actors refrain from investing because activities 
are interdependent. Any new branch requires simultaneous investments in 
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complementary activities to become viable, so that no investor darestaking the first 
stepunless they can be sure that others will provide the interrelated assets. This, of 
course, is a very common situation at the beginning of a country’s industrial 
development. The quote from Collier and Venables illustrates the problem. Thus 
latecomers need a coordinated ‘big push’—e.g. simultaneously attracting and/or 
nurturing providers of key inputs and investing in infrastructure, skills, and 
technological services—if they want to establish cluster synergies in order to make up 
for the advantage of established competitors.  
Second, there is typically a lack of opportunity entrepreneurship. While Naudé 
(2011) suggests that poor countries may have as many citizens with the necessary 
personal traits for entrepreneurship as any other country, the institutional set-up of pre-
capitalist societies typically discourages entrepreneurial behaviour in a number of ways. 
This holds for social norms as much as for economic incentives. Social norms, as 
reflected inter alia in school curricula, may not be supportive of curiosity, creativity, and 
search. Some societies do not promote the pursuit of personal achievements, e.g. they 
have built-in social norms that oblige those who have earned an extraordinary income to 
share it with their community, thereby discouraging the search for business ideas and 
constraining capital accumulation. Also, the weakness of institutions providing risk 
assurance leads to risk-averse attitudes. Last but not least, would-be entrepreneurs in 
poor countries live in an information-scarce environment where managerial role models, 
sophisticated customers, and new business ideas are in short supply.  
Thus governments have an important role in nurturing entrepreneurship. They need to 
foster a societal consensus on the desirability of entrepreneurship for the society at 
large, to create a cultural and business environment that encourages risk-taking 
behaviour and fosters an ‘achievement culture’, and to facilitate training of 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills. Moreover, they need to create a learning 
environment that balances protection and competitive challenge, on the one hand, the 
nascent entrepreneurial class needs a certain degree of protection to avoid that imports 
and direct investments from more advanced economies asphyxiate the emerging 
companies, on the other hand, competition needs to augment gradually to ensure that 
national enterprises continuously improve their performance.  
Even in mature capitalist societies with advanced entrepreneurial and managerial skills, 
there is a case for subsidizing the search for new business options, because the social 
value of discovering new products or processes can be far greater than the return on 
investment for the innovator. Developing a new business idea is costly and involves the 
risk of failure. When the idea materializes, however, competitors may quickly copy it. 
While this may offer enormous advantages to the local economy, the copycats dissipate 
the rents that the risk-taking innovator could have obtained from his innovation. Due to 
this non-appropriability, innovative business models are typically undersupplied. This 
calls for government programmes to stimulate the discovery of new business 
opportunities (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). 
Third, the enterprise structure of latecomer countries is typically fragmented. In well-
functioning market economies, companies that bring a superior product or process to the 
market obligate their competitors either to make comparable improvements or to exit 
the market. This process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 1942) homogenizes 
factor productivity across all surviving companies. In developing countries, however, it 
does not work well. Here, the initial productivity gap between modern enterprises (e.g.   4
foreign corporations) and traditional cottage industries is so huge that the latter cannot 
simply emulate the sophisticated business models of the former. At the same time, the 
latter employ the bulk of the workforce (OECD 2009), and it is impossible for the more 
efficient firms to absorb additional workers at the same rate at which inefficient firms 
disappear (unless GDP grows at very high rates over several decades). As a 
consequence, owners and workers of these firms typically retain their economic 
activities even at minimal levels of productivity. Contrary to Schumpeter’s assumption, 
the productivity of newly established firms does not exceed that of exiting firms (Tybout 
2000).As a result, a large, mostly unregistered, survivalist economy persists alongside 
modern firms, and the productivity spread is much greater than it is in mature market 
economies. Moreover, due to low productivity, low quality, and lack of proper 
registration, modern, scale-intensive and registered firms only rarely engage in business 
transactions with small informal enterprises. Governments have an important role in 
narrowing the productivity gap and reducing fragmentation. This implies helping micro 
and small enterprises to increase their productivity, linking them to clusters and value 
chains, and improving the employability of those engaged in survivalist activities.  
2.2  The necessary capabilities for successful industrial policy-making  
In sum, neoclassical standard assumptions about the allocative efficiency of markets 
apply much less to low-income countries than they do to rich countries with their more 
sophisticated institutions. It is therefore hard to imagine a catching up process without a 
pro-active government that helps to manage structural change, supporting 
diversification, and the development of new activities that promise to generate more and 
better paid jobs and other social benefits. This is what industrial policy is about. For the 
purpose of this section, we define industrial policy as any government measure, or set of 
measures, to shape structural change in ways that the government views as desirable. 
This implies selectivity, i.e. certain economic activities are favoured over others that are 
regarded less promising for national development.  
Neoclassical theorists criticize such selectivity for distorting the allocative efficiency of 
markets. Bureaucrats, they argue, should not ‘pick winners’. In practice, however, all 
governments provide differential support in favour of particular new technologies, 
regions or sectors. More interventionist governments even support selected groups of 
firms at the micro-level, which greatly increases the risks of collusive behaviour.  
In any case, making the right policy choices is not an easy task, and implementing 
policies in ways that help to overcome market failures rather than creating new costs of 
doing business is equally demanding. For the following analysis we distinguish two key 
capabilities that the political leadership needs to have to shape structural change in a 
welfare-enhancing way. 
First, policymakers need strategic capabilityto develop a ‘national project’ of 
productive transformation that is viable and widely accepted and supported by the 
society. Such a ‘project’ includes strategic choices about investment priorities, which in 
turn implies value-based judgements, e.g. how much external pressure is acceptable, 
whether growth takes precedence over distribution, and who deserves protection for 
how much time. Furthermore, it presupposes a good understanding of the changing 
requirements of the global economy, the ability to observe industrial developments at   5
home and abroad in order to identify ‘latent’ comparative advantages,2 and to translate 
the observed phenomena into a strategy of incremental socio-economic transformation. 
It further requires the ability to create a social contract in support of this strategy. Where 
external actors play key roles, such as large foreign investors or donor agencies, it is 
important to align them with the strategy. Ohno (2009) has highlighted how important 
the ability to define a clear policy vision and strategy has been in the industrialization of 
Asian countries.  
Second, policy makers must be able to set up service agencies and devise incentive 
schemes and verifiable performance measurement systems for them to ensure effective 
and customer-oriented implementation of regulatory and supporting services. 
Meritocratic recruitment and promotion systems are keyto improving such 
implementing capability. Furthermore, ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans 1995) is needed, 
i.e. policy makers need to interact closely with the private sector to gain a thorough 
understanding of business opportunities and constraints and identify market failure, but 
they must also have the autonomy to withdraw or reallocate rents before they become 
unproductive—often against the resistance of incumbents. 
2.3  The risks of industrial policy 
Industrial policy increases the profitability of some activities and reduces the 
profitability of others. This necessarily involves risks of government failure. Such 
failure may come from two sources: inabilityand/or intentionalpolitical capture of rents.  
With regard to inability, critics of industrial policy frequently claim that governments 
are unlikely to identify promising future investments that market actors do not recognize 
(Pack and Saggi 2006). This critique is plausible as far as immediate business 
opportunities are concerned. Governments should therefore not intervene in micro-level 
investment decisions. They may, however, have a facilitating role in organizing sector 
groups, pulling information together, and initiating participatory search processes to 
identify market failures that hamper the long-term development of a particular activity. 
Moreover, they may advocate public interests, such as the quest for socially inclusive 
and environmentally sustainable patterns of production. As regards the implementation 
of policies, reviews have shown that the services that state agencies are expected to 
deliver to the private sector are often quite inefficient, mainly because their incentive 
systems do not stimulate them to operate in a business-like and customer-oriented 
manner (Committee of Donor Agencies 2001). The challenge would thus be to reform 
the incentive systems for these agencies, e.g. allowing for more competition among 
service providers, privatizing certain services, or introducing results-based management.  
The issue of incentives takes us to the next point: the existence of political interests and 
power relations, and the related risk of intentionalpolitical capture of rents. As Chang 
(1996) observed, it would be naïve to assume that governments always and only try to 
maximize public welfare. Three interest groups typically try to make use of industrial 
policies for their own interests:  
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•  Beneficiaries in the private sector are interested in influencing rules and 
regulations in such a way that economic rents are increased, for example via 
subsidies, restriction of market entry for competitors, and decreasing 
contributions to the society (taxes, severance payments, etc.); 
•  Politicians may use industrial policies as an instrument of patronage in order to 
enhance their legitimacy and win elections; 
•  State agencies are interested in maximizing their budgets, hiring more 
employees, and paying them higher salaries. Hence they have an incentive to 
implement programmes, regardless of their efficiency.  
Industrial policy effectiveness is thus not primarily a technical issue that can be solved 
with education and training of stakeholders; the main challenge is political, namely how 
to create and withdraw economic rents with a view to technological capacity building 
and productivity enhancement. These mechanisms can easily be captured by interest 
groups, unless a strong system of checks and balances is in place.  
2.4  When political systems build on political capture: neopatrimonialism 
Both problems—the inability to design and implement appropriate policies as well as 
political capture—can be expected to be particularly serious in poor countries. Those 
countries’ ability is more limited, ceteris paribus, due to resource constraints. Therefore, 
subsidies tend to be modest, agencies understaffed, and the outreach of programmes 
low. The fact that public pay scales are usually not competitive implies that the best 
trained personnel often prefer to work for private companies or international (donor) 
organizations.  
There are also good reasons to assume that political capture occurs more frequently in 
developing countries, because these typically lack many of the checks and balances that 
hold politicians and executive organs accountable in mature democracies—including 
electoral competition, an independent judiciary, an autonomous central auditing 
authority, critical feedback from independent media, as well as monitoring and 
evaluation routines, e.g. 80 per cent of all low- and lower middle-income countries rank 
below the median on the topic of ‘judicial independence’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2008). Public officials thus have more discretionary power. The combination 
of low salaries in the public sector—officials usually depend on additional sources of 
income—and considerable discretionary power stimulates favouritism and bribery. 
Governance indicators in fact confirm that these phenomena are especially pervasive in 
low- and lower middle-income countries. According to the same source, 71 per cent of 
these countries rank in the bottom half regarding ‘favouritism in decisions of 
government officials’. The Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 
2008)3 ranks 82 per cent in the bottom half with regard to ‘control of corruption’.  
To gain a better understanding of the way policies are designed and implemented in 
developing countries, we refer to the concept of ‘neopatrimonialism’. The last decades 
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have witnessed remarkable transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes and 
from centrally planned to market economies. This has occurred in all developing 
regions. In most cases, however, the new political and economic institutions did not 
fully replace those that existed before the transition. Instead, ‘hybrid regimes’(Diamond 
2002) emerged, in which the state is often formally shaped after the principles of 
modern statehood, but permeated to a high degree by informal institutions that are based 
on arbitrary decision-making or at least non-codified and non-actionable rules.  Over the 
last twenty years, many attempts have been made to analyse and classify these hybrid 
regime types.4 While the authors mostly agree on the increasing relevance of such 
hybrids between modern rule-based democracies and traditional political systems, no 
consensus has been reached in terms of terminology and classification. Instead, new 
concepts have proliferated, such as ‘partial’ (Epstein et al. 2006), ‘illiberal’ (Zakaria 
2003) or ‘defective democracies’ (Croissant and Merkel 2004).  
For the purpose of this section, the concept of neopatrimonialism captures the most 
important elements that help to explain the phenomenon of political capture in industrial 
policy-making. While some authors conceptualize neopatrimonialism as a subcategory 
of hybrid regimes (and thus distinct from democratic and authoritarian regimes), this 
section follows Erdmann and Engel (2006) who identify elements of neopatrimonial 
rule in different regime types, including ‘illiberal’ democracies and authoritarian 
regimes.  
The following characterization integrates the main characteristics of neopatrimonialism 
identified in the work of Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Erdmann and Engel 
(2006). According to them, neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two systems: (1) a 
patrimonial system of personal relations, where the private and the public realm are not 
separated, with the effect that ‘obedience is owed not to enacted rules but to the person 
who occupies a position of authority or tradition or who has been chosen for it by the 
traditional master’ (Weber 1978: 227, cited in Erdmann and Engel 2006: 8), and (2) a 
legal-rational system that clearly separates these realms and consistently applies 
codified and actionable rules. Building on Weber (1978), legal-rational bureaucratic rule 
is characterized, among others, by the following elements: officials are hired and 
promoted according to proven technical qualifications; they receive a fixed salary 
according to their rank in the hierarchy; promotion is dependent on the judgement of 
superiors; each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence; the office is the only 
or primary occupation of the employee and they are is controlled in the conduct of their 
office. In neopatrimonial systems, such norms may formally also be valid, but their 
social practice is often personalized and informal.  
The following elements characterize neopatrimonialism:  
1.  Presidentialism with strongconcentration of power, whereby the ruler and inner 
circles of power partly exercise power in a privatized and discretionary way. 
Decision-making is thus frequently not based on laws and regulations, and only 
few institutional checks and balances exist to hold decisionmakers accountable. 
The president is a ‘strongman’ and the ‘centrifugal force around which all else 
revolves’ (Sandbrook 1986: 323). 
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2.  Politicalclientelism and patronage. Clientelism refers to the award of personal 
favours, such as public employment, personal promotion or preferential 
treatment in the bureaucracy, in exchange for votes or other forms of loyalty. 
Rulers appoint members of the political elite to hold key positions in 
thebureaucracy and the state economy. These in turn assign positions or give 
other favours to their personal clients and so on, thus creating a cascading 
system of patron-client relationships that ensures loyalty with the political elite. 
While clientelism refers to personalized relations, patronagemeansthe strategic 
use of state resources to win the electoral and other political support from larger, 
anonymoussocietal groups, but also to enhance political cohesion among 
regions, social and/or ethnic groups.  
The concept of neopatrimonialism suggests that two different spheres of government—
politicians and the state bureaucracy—may employ state resources to buy political 
support. Even though both are part of an encompassing system of patron-client 
relationships, they may pursue different, even contrarian, aims. For example, politicians 
may have an interest in making services for the general public cheaper and better, 
whereas bureaucracies may prefer to maximize their budgets and focus support on their 
personal clients.  
Industrial policy plays an important role in stabilizing neopatrimonialism as it creates 
political space for politicians and bureaucrats to allocate government resources to 
specific groups of beneficiaries. These can be employed to strengthen ties of loyalty 
between individual politicians or bureaucrats and private beneficiaries, but also to buy 
political support from specific social and ethnic groups that are considered important for 
the survival of the incumbent regime. As we have argued in the previous section, 
governments of industrial latecomer countries need to create, protect and nurture a 
national entrepreneurial class. This implies the creation of rents for a selected social 
group. If governments derive their legitimacy systematically from patronage and 
clientelism, it greatly increases the risk that rents are created for political supporters 
rather than to maximize welfare. This risk is further aggravated as policy choices among 
sub-sectors and technologies build on assumptions about dynamic scale economies and 
future knowledge spillovers that are necessarily subjective and debatable. Consequently, 
politicians and bureaucrats who want to employ industrial policy for patronage and 
clientelism can easily find technical justifications to mask their political objectives.  
For these reasons, many researchers and practitioners doubt that industrial policies can 
work under neopatrimonial rule. Proponents of public choice theory especially deny 
this, as they assume that the relevant stakeholders—governments, bureaucrats, business 
people—act as simply self-interested individuals who create rents for their own material 
interests or to increase their legitimacy and political power. Hence, the public sector 
would try to expand activities that increase its discretionary power for rent creation, 
using differential trade and tax regimes, direct subsidies, licenses and so on, whereas the 
private sector would lobby for access to such rents, and those who benefit would oppose 
any liberalization that might reduce their rents (for instance, Krueger 1974). Political 
systems that owe their legitimacy to the distribution of specific benefits to their clients 
are of course especially susceptible to rent-seeking behaviour, especially when the 
number of large enterprises is fairly small, relationships between politics and business 
are highly personalized, and checks and balances are weak (Bräutigam 2000). Even 
scholars, who defend the need for industrial policies in principle, are often sceptical 
about their applicability at early stages of industrialization. Soludo and Ogbu(2004: 27),   9
for example, state that ‘only when the state is capable and developmental, and has a 
vibrant capitalist class can industrial policies be effective’. 
The assumption that all stakeholders simply pursue self-interests, however, needs to be 
qualified on two grounds. First, politicians and bureaucrats are not only driven by short-
term interests of revenue maximization. They are, to different degrees, also motivated 
by elements of social responsibility, personal reputation, and professionalism. Altruistic 
considerations, the quest for social recognition, the need to ensure legitimacy in the 
longer term as well as prevailing ideologies and paradigms all play important roles. 
Second, the assumptions of public choice theory are challenged by empirical evidence. 
Some Asian countries with strong neopatrimonial traits—such as Indonesia under 
Suharto and Malaysia under Mahathir—have extensively applied industrial policies and 
achieved rapid industrialization combined with considerable welfare gains (Khan and 
Jomo 2000; Moore and Schmitz 2008). Such success can hardly be explained under the 
assumption of indiscriminate pursuit of self-interests.  
3  Evidence: industrial policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region 
This section explores the performance of industrial policies in SSA and the MENA 
region. These two regions are most frequently associated with neopatrimonialism (e.g. 
Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bank and Richter 2010; Pawelka 1985), and both are 
among the leastcompetitive regions in non-resource based industries. Not surprisingly, 
the (unfortunately scarce) literature on industrial policy in these regions is mostly very 
critical with regard to effects and prospects of industrial policy.5 Recently, however, 
some dissenting voices started to reinterpret informal public-private ties as being 
(partly) functional for development. Kelsall et al. published a paper on ‘developmental 
patrimonialism’ in SSA, arguing that ‘centralized, long-horizon rent-seeking, when 
combined with broadly pro-capitalist policies, can generate dynamic growth’ (Kelsall et 
al. 2010: 26). Along similar lines, Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2010) discover public-
private ‘growth coalitions’ in Egypt. 
Against the backdrop of these inconsistent findings, the German Development Institute 
(DIE) conducted a comparative analysis of industrial policy performance in fourSSAn 
and three MENA countries; a synopsis of overall findings follows. For most countries, 
these confirm the critical views on industrial policy under neopatrimonial rule. Two 
countries, however, challenge the standard assumptions about the inability of 
neopatrimonial systems to contain rent-seeking and manage successful productive 
transformation: Tunisia and Ethiopia. These cases are therefore presented in some 
detail. 
3.1  Industrial policy in seven countries: main findings 
The following analysis includes the Sub-Saharan countries Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Namibia, and Nigeria as well as Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia in the MENA region.6 All of 
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these countries apply selective support programmes for particular technologies and 
groups of firms, defined either by sub-sector, value chain, region, or target market. The 
research explored to what extent neopatrimonial patterns impinge on industrial policy 
decisions and what this implies for their effectiveness.  
The case studies confirm that neopatrimonialism is indeed pervasive in industrial 
policymaking. Interview partners frequently mentioned cases where decisions regarding 
public contracts, credit allocation, jobs in the public sectors etc., had been taken on the 
basis of arrangements that did not correspond to the stipulated rules and regulations. It 
goes without saying, that these informal practices cannot be corroborated easily, 
precisely because neopatrimonialism implies the coexistence of formally valid legal-
rational norms with informal social practices that function beyond the legal surface. The 
following observations are therefore based upon qualitative information gathered from 
experts, published case studies, grey literature, and own observations. All these sources 
mainly capture perceptions rather than hard evidence. To avoid mistakes or unfair 
judgements, information has been carefully cross-checked with country experts in 
different positions. 
Presidentialismwith a high degree ofconcentration of power is a common element in all 
seven countries. Decisions about industrial policies can often be directly attributed to 
the president, with fairly limited influence of the parliament. Presidents often personally 
preside over the most important committees related to industrial development, use 
personal media appearances to promote industrialization programmes, and personally 
visit business associations to urge their members to join government initiatives. In some 
cases they intervene directly in industry-specific decisions. Ethiopia’s President Meles 
Zenawi, for example, stepped in to resolve problems in the emerging cut flower 
industry, including the negotiation of more favourable freight tariffs with the national 
airline and the allotment of land under favourable leasing conditions. Business tycoons 
often directly approach the presidents if they need to solve a specific problem rather 
than using formal channels. Furthermore, members of elites with trustful personal 
relations with the president are appointed to key positions of the public administration 
and state-owned enterprises or parastatals. In some cases, the presidents and intimates 
are directly involved as shareholders in large national investment projects, for example 
in the case of Mozambique’s president Guebuza. 
In all seven countries, institutional checks and balances are weak. They all rank clearly 
below OECD standards on governance indicators, although with substantial differences 
between countries. Namibia and Mozambique rank remarkably higher on the relevant 
indicators of ‘voice and accountability’, ‘political participation’, and ‘rule of law’ than 
Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Syria. With regard to the World Bank 
indicator for ‘voice and accountability’, for example, the latter five all rank below the 
25th percentile (2009).7 Looking at industrial policy in particular, programmes are not 
rigorously evaluated in any of the countries, with the exception of some programmes 
                                                 
7  See: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI) for ‘political participation’ (2010) more or less confirms this picture. (See: 
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/bti/) With regard to ‘rule of law’ World Bank and 
BTI data are inconsistent. Here, the World Bank ranks the MENA countries fairly high, similar to 
Namibia and Mozambique, whereas the BTI gives the lowest scores to the three MENA countries and 
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with strong financial involvement of donors.Some countries do conduct regular and 
detailed indicativeplanning, e.g. to prepare five-year plans, which may entail mid-term 
and final reviews (e.g. in Ethiopia). These, however, tend to monitor activities, rather 
than outcomes or impacts. Moreover, they are not carried out by independent parties 
and rarely challenge the fundamentals of how programmes and institutions are 
organized. 
The case studies also revealed widespread clientelism and patronagein industrial policy 
operating through a variety of channels. One important channel is the assignment of 
jobs in the public administration and state-owned enterpriseson the basis of political 
loyalty rather than professional merits. In Mozambique, it is well-known that positions 
in the civil service are almost entirely reserved for members of the ruling FRELIMO 
party. In some cases, organizations affiliated with the ruling party also have 
considerable influence on the award of jobs, such as the National Union of Namibian 
Workers. Typically, those employed in the public sector and state-owned enterprises 
receive a range of benefits, such as higher wages, pension and insurance schemes, 
severance payments and public holidays, which are not granted to other citizens.  
Another mechanism of clientelism is privatization of state enterprises. In Mozambique, 
after the civil war FRELIMO transferred privatized companies to politically associated 
persons and supported them with subsidized credit, with the dual objective of creating a 
national class of entrepreneurs and enhancing political loyalty. In Egypt, state 
enterprises, e.g. in the steel and cement industries, have been transferred to intimates of 
President Mubarak who have been able to reap considerable rents from these protected 
industries. 
In addition to such collusive practices of privatization, politically connected companies 
have often taken many of the business opportunities left for private engagement. 
Examples include companies owned by members of the ruling party (e.g. in 
Mozambique), the military (as in Egypt and Syria) or party-affiliated endowment 
funds(as in Ethiopia). As a result, the borderline between business and politics is often 
blurred. Entrepreneurs who compete with state-owned and politically connected 
enterprises frequently claimed that those enterprises get preferential treatment when it 
comes to operating and import licences, public purchasing, and credit from the state 
banking system, or that they are bailed out in times of crisis. As government decisions 
in these fields are often not transparent and may not be subject to checks and balances, 
however, it is very difficult to verify such allegations. Moreover, the case studies 
suggest an overall shift towards economic liberalization, albeit not necessarily with 
increased political freedom. Most notably in the three MENA countries, new 
technocratic and industrial elites emerged that depend less on oil and gas revenues, 
international aid and other rents.  
How do these neopatrimonial practices influence the effectiveness of industrial policies? 
In this regard we found remarkable differences. This is particularly true for strategic 
capability.All countries have formally laid down their industrial development objectives 
in plans or ‘vision’ documents that outline medium-term targets until 2025 or 2030, but 
the practical relevance of these plans varies greatly. In most cases, the national 
strategies express overall targets (e.g. to increase value-added or to develop new export 
activities) and in some cases identify priority sectors (such as ‘agro-industries’ or ‘the 
textile industry’), but they do not provide a clear perspective with regard to where the 
countries may have a latent comparative advantage, what the most binding constraints   12
are, and what concrete steps should be taken to gradually move into more rewarding 
activities. Moreover, plans are often not well harmonized with the budgeting process. In 
smaller countries, planning documents are sometimes drafted by international 
consultants rather than developed in a participatory national planning process. In several 
cases, not even the main implementing agencies and competent private sector 
associations attributed any importance to these strategies. The two exceptional cases are 
Ethiopia and Tunisia.8 As the following sections show, both countries have 
operationalized strategies for industrial upgrading and diversification, and the top 
leadership is clearly committed to follow up on these agendas. 
With regard to implementing capability, the project encountered numerous examples of 
poor performance in all countries, but also some fairly successful projects. Due to 
attribution gaps and lack of counterfactual evidence it is generally difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of industrial policies. In many cases, however, failure was obvious. For 
example, most programmes aimed at promoting investments in export processing zones 
fell clearly short of their targets and often failed to attract more than a handful of 
investors (e.g. in Nigeria and Namibia). Similarly, several investment promotion 
agencies performed miserably, not only because they failed to attract much foreign 
investment, but also because many companies that did invest stated that they did not 
make use of any of their services except for compulsory licensing issues (e.g. in the case 
of Ethiopia). In Mozambique, efforts to transfer state-owned enterprises to private 
entrepreneurs and support them with subsidized credits largely failed, and large parts of 
the credits were never paid back. SME promotion agencieswere generally rated as 
highly inefficient in terms of impact and outreach9 and several SME development funds 
were discontinued due to dissatisfactory performance.10 In some cases, government 
sources admit policy failure. A Nigerian government report assessed that the country’s 
system of fiscal incentives was lacking in focus and poorly administered. Overall, 
industrial development programmes are typically initiated without defining an exit 
strategy, which may make it difficult to withdraw rents when they are no longer needed.  
Some industrial policies, however, seem to have been quite successful.Tunisia’s 
industrial upgrading programme is a case in point. The long-term effort to support the 
competitiveness of enterprises with the aim of tapping into outsourcing opportunities 
from Europe successfully strengthened and diversified the export industry. Increases in 
manufacturing investments in Egypt and improved export performance could also be 
traced back to industry modernization and investment promotion programmes. In the 
Sub-Saharan countries, the case studies identified a handful of successful initiatives in 
particular sub-sectors. These where usually related to areas of latent comparative 
advantage where powerful investors pushed for supporting measures and regulatory 
reforms. Examples include the development of the aluminium smelter and supporting 
industries cluster in Mozambique and the Ethiopian cut flower industry. In some cases, 
                                                 
8  The research referred to Tunisia under Ben Ali, who was ousted in January 2011. It is not clear, to 
what extent the new government will deviate new directions from the authoritarian take. 
9  Such as the Instituto de Desenvolvimento da Industria Localin Mozambique, the Small Scale 
Enterprise Development Agency in Nigeria, and the Federation of Medium and Small Enterprise 
Development Agencies in Ethiopia. 
10 Including the Fundo de Fomento a Pequena Industria in Mozambique and the Small and Medium 
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donor support facilitated successful initiatives, e.g. supporting incipient clusters of 
pharmaceutical and leather industries in Ethiopia and Namibian exporters of plant 
products for the cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries.  
Tunisia and Ethiopia are particularly interesting due to their clear commitment to an 
agenda of industrial transformation and reasonably effective implementation. In 
Tunisia, this commitment resulted in sustained economic growth relative to the rest of 
the Maghreb/Mashriq region, an increasing share of manufacturing in GDP and a 
rapidly growing urban middle class. Tunisia today scores far higher on the global 
competitiveness index than any other country of its region. Ethiopia achieved sustained 
growth of over 10 per cent annually in the period 2005 to 2010 and is one of the few 
Sub-Saharan countries on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Its 
industrial development and economic diversification are not satisfactory, but progress in 
terms of human capital formation and firm productivity are expected to spur industrial 
development in the near future. 
The strong development commitment and above-average performance of Tunisia and 
Ethiopia is somewhat unexpected, because both governments are quite authoritarian and 
score particularly low on political participation.11 Ethiopia, furthermore, ranks clearly 
below the average of SSA on indicators of rule of law and regulatory quality.12Why did 
these two countries—despite weak governance and typical characteristics of 
neopatrimonialism—manage to foster productive transformation better than the other 
countries? According to almost any governance indicator, policy processes should be 
much more effective in Namibia and Mozambique—but none of these countries makes 
visible progress in terms of industrialization, enterprise upgrading, and diversification.  
The following sections summarize the industrial policies and the performance of 
Ethiopia and Tunisia. The two countries are at very different stages of economic and 
institutional development. Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 
119th in terms of global competitiveness (2010–11). Its challenge is to create the very 
basic preconditions for industrial development in an agrarian post-war society. Tunisia 
is a middle-income country ranking 32nd on global competitiveness, and it is in the 
middle of a transformation from a rent-based, state-driven, and inward-looking 
economy to a modern industrial market economy which is increasingly integrated into 
European value chains.  
3.2  Ethiopia: creating conditions for industrial development in an agrarian post-
war society13 
Ethiopia is one of the world’s least developed countries. The country is still largely 
agrarian, with 85 per cent of the workforce engaged in the rural economy. Its main 
resources are agrarian, but the potential for commercial crop production is limited as 
only small areas are irrigated and rainfalls are irregular. From 1974 until 1991, the 
country was ruled by a pro-Soviet military junta that nationalized most industries and 
                                                 
11 On the BTI 2010 ranking of political participation, Tunisia scores 2.5 and Ethiopia 3.0 (against a 
maximum of 10 points).  
12 World Bank Governance Indicators for 2009. 
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private urban real-estate holdings. Mismanagement and the junta’s violent rule 
provoked a protracted civil war.  
When the civil war ended in 1991, the incoming government under President Meles 
Zenawi was confronted with a situation of multiple market failure; it recognized the 
private sector as the main driver of economic growth, but there was very little private 
sector to build upon, as the better educated and entrepreneurial persons had mostly fled 
the country during the years of socialist dictatorship and civil war. Moreover, the new 
regime distrusted the old elites which it regarded as rent-seekers interested in making 
quick money from trade and financial transactions rather than investing in industrial 
infrastructure and technological capabilities. Also, the main potential lay in improved 
agricultural productivity and agro-processing, but the rural areas lacked irrigation and 
roads, let alone cold chains to market perishable products. After the previous socialist 
government’s failed effort to collectivise farmers, land was returned to smallholders, 
which additionally made it difficult to attract large-scale investments in agriculture. 
Finally, the education system was unable to supply the skills needed both in government 
and the private sector.  
In this situation, the government embarked on an ambitious top-down transformation 
project. Its aim was to industrialize the country with a focus on export-led growth. Big 
public investments were made in infrastructure and education, including the foundation 
of about twenty new universities and the establishment of a system of technical and 
vocational education and training (TVET) which, by 2010, had 815,000 enrolled 
students. Specialized institutions for sector-specific technology development were 
created. Simultaneously, the government pushed for technological upgrading and 
export-orientation of national industries that would absorb the skilled workforce once it 
had graduated from the university and TVET systems. Leading companies were 
involved in an upgrading programme in which the government set export targets and 
offered consulting and credit on the basis of performance. 
While encouraging private investments, the government made sure that it kept control 
of the economy and established clear limits to liberalization. It privatized many state-
owned enterprises, but defined narrow boundaries for private engagement in the 
financial sector and maintained its monopoly in telecommunications. It facilitated long-
term lease contracts for investors in agriculture, but refrained from liberalizing rural 
land markets; it invites donor support, while carefully avoiding aid dependency, so as to 
retain control over its economic policies.  
The government applies an authoritarian command and control style of policy-making. 
It distinguishes ‘developmental entrepreneurs’ from ‘rent-seekers’ and interferes to 
support the former and limit the scope for the latter; it favours producers over traders, 
and exporters over producers for the local market; and it handpicks companies for its 
enterprise upgrading programmes. Business associations are used to convey the 
government’s messages and educate their members rather than to engage in an open 
dialogue. When opposition forces gained influence in the 2005 elections and started to 
seriously challenge the government, the leadership of the Ethiopian Chamber of 
Commerce was replaced. The overall attitude towards the private sector is to educate, 
guide, and train, rather than to encourage creativity and competition. The ambiguity of 
government policy is also reflected in its public sector reform. A business process re-
engineering programme has been implemented to strengthen meritocracy and improve   15
performance; below the surface of this programme, however, critics claim that the 
restructuring process was used to remove political dissenters from office.  
Hence, Ethiopia’s policy can be characterized as an authoritarian, politically controlled, 
and state-led attempt to create a competitive economy. In this attempt, informal ties 
with parts of the business community have an important role. Following the civil war, 
endowment funds were created from remaining war funds and incoming aid, which 
were allocated to ex-combatants. Their dual purpose was to reward and reintegrate 
combatants and to reconstruct the country. As the liberation fronts were organized along 
ethnic lines, so are the endowment funds. How exactly these funds were allocated, and 
how big they are, is not transparent. Although they operate as non-governmental public 
charity organizations, they have never been audited and there is no transparency with 
regard to management structure, or profits and losses. Private competitors claim that 
endowment companies have preferential access to credit facilities of the state-owned 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and that indebted companies have been bailed out, but 
due to the discretionary character of many government policies it is not possible to 
verify these allegations. In any case, due to their head start, the endowment companies 
seized many unfilled business opportunities and are now among the largest investors. 
Industrial policies often provide support on a case-by-case basis. Leading agro-
industries, textile, garment, and leather product companies are targeted to become role 
models for their respective sectors and make inroads in export markets. Beneficiaries 
may receive land, buildings, or consultancies at highly subsidized rates. While subsidy 
allocation is discretionary, it generally seems to be based on assumptions about 
spillover effects and benefits different types of enterprises. While state-owned and 
endowment companies are among the beneficiaries, there is no strong bias in their 
favour. In exchange for support, the government expects companies to support its 
development programmes. This is particularly true for endowment companies. When 
the government launched a cooperative vocational training programme, for example, 
these companies were expected to accommodate students. 
Ethiopia’s is now starting to reap the benefits of its coordinated effort to develop 
infrastructure, human capital, and the private sector. It achieved extraordinary economic 
growth of over 10 per cent annually in the period 2005 to 2010, increasing per capita 
GDP from US$682 to 1,120 (PPP). In 2010, 29 per cent of the about 81 million 
population were estimated to live below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day (PPP)—a 
considerable improvement compared to the 61 per cent reported in 1995. Industrial 
development is stagnating at a low level, and export competitiveness and diversification 
are increasing only slowly. However, progress has been made in terms of human capital 
formation and productivity of its larger enterprises, which is likely tospur industrial 
development in the near future.  
Ethiopia’s industrial development strategy blends different ideological elements. As in 
Western market economies, the private sector is recognized as the main driver of 
growth. At the same time, carrots and sticks are used to develop specific groups of 
enterprises and push them towards exporting. Korea, Taiwan, and Japan are Ethiopia’s 
role models in this regard. Moreover, the preference for manufacturing industries and 
disdain of trade and commerce can be seen as a legacy of the Marxist roots of the 
liberation movement. Overall, the regime deserves to be characterized as 
‘developmental’. Government interference in the economy is strong, but generally with 
the intention to achieve government targets rather than for personal enrichment.   16
Enterprise surveys confirm that corruption is clearly below Sub-Saharan levels. Still, 
non-transparent state-business relations and the lack of institutional checks and balances 
give cause for serious concern and may derail the developmental course of the 
government any time.  
3.3  Tunisia: managing the transition from a state-led pre-industrial society to an 
export-driven market economy14 
When Tunisia became independent in 1956, it hosted only 290 enterprises of more than 
50 employees; 85 per cent of the firms were owned by foreigners. The incipient national 
entrepreneurial class was mainly engaged in small agricultural and commercial 
activities. Industry employed only 2 per cent of the workforce. Aside from some 
phosphates and iron ore, Tunisia did not possess significantfossil and mineral resources, 
and its farming sector was heavily dependent on seasonal rainfall. The country had 
inherited an educated middle class and a fairly professional civil service from the 
French, but it lacked many of the skills needed for industrial development. At the time 
of independence, Tunisia did not have asingle institution of higher education. Hence, 
although Tunisia at independence was not as poor as Ethiopia after the civil war, but it 
was confronted with similarly adverse conditions for economic development. 
Today, the country has an export-led market economy based on competitive private 
companies. Over the last 15 years, Tunisia has achieved sustainable economic growth of 
about 5 per cent annually, which compares favourably with other countries of the 
region. In 2010, industry accounted for 34.6 per cent of GDP, up from 11.9 per cent in 
1980. Manufacturing exports are gradually shifting from simple garment assembly to 
more demanding electronic and mechanical products. Recently, the country has 
intensified its efforts to advance towardsan innovation-oriented economy, with new 
support schemes, including ‘techno-cities’ and business incubators, and considerable 
investments in new activities, such as information and communication technologies 
andsolar energy. Tunisia’sindustrial development programme was labour-intensive and 
relatively inclusive, enabling the emergence of a considerable middle class; 80 per cent 
of the Tunisian population are officially rated ‘middle class’. The US$2/day poverty 
rate fell to 3.8 per cent (2005). 
This success was achieved on the basis of an authoritarian system. From 1956 until 
2011, only two presidents ruled the country—Bourguiba until 1987, and Ben Ali until 
2011—whose power was close to being absolute, building in particular on a dominant 
party system, a professional palace administration, anda repressive security apparatus. 
While their rule is best characterized as authoritarian, both presidents recurred to 
neopatrimonial politics to reinforce their power. Leading positions within state 
institutions were reserved for party members (and, under Ben Ali, increasingly also 
loyal technocrats). Importantpolicy decisionswere taken by a very small circle of top 
decision makers from the ruling party and the key institutions of the central state. 
Bourguiba had created a largely uncontrolled presidential ‘shadow’ budget, which 
allowedhim to create personal links to key social actors, including the country’s 
business elites. Anextended clientelist network clustered around the presidential family 
itself. Furthermore, the social security schemes and subsidized commodities and utilities 
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were used to grant privileges to state officials and public sector employees.Patronage 
resource was employed to buy support from specific societal groups. Examples include 
preferential customs rates for small cars, subsidized personal computers for low-
incomefamilies, and subsidies for the interior provinces. Some of theseschemes 
operated outside the state budget and were granted in an adhoc fashion. 
Tunisia is thus another interesting case of successful structural change under 
neopatrimonial rule. This development, however, was not straightforward. Following 
independence, president Bouguiba initially tried to avoidevery step that could possibly 
scare investors away, many of them still foreigners. It soon became apparent, however, 
that it would not be possible to unleash economic growth and create sufficient 
employment for the rapidly growing population unless the government would undertake 
pro-active measures to develop indigenous productive capabilities. In the early 1960s, 
the government therefore embarked on an import-substitution strategy. In parallel, 
Bourguiba enacted social reforms, e.g. liberating women from their religiously 
sanctioned dependency on male family members and enabling them to participate in the 
modern labour market. As a result of this new policy, thenumber of state-owned 
enterprises and public sector organizations increased from lessthan 25 in 1960 to about 
185 in 1970, and their share of national investment grew from 2 to 34 per cent.  
As in many other countries, import-substituting industrialization proved to be 
financially unsustainable. In the early 1970s, Tunisia therefore started to complement 
import-substitution with export promotion, with a focus on labour-intensive 
manufacturing. About 800 new industrial ventures emerged in the following years, 
effectively doubling industrial capacity.The private share in industrial investment, 
which was only 22 per cent in the 1960s, rose to 43 per cent in the mid-1980s. Still, 
loss-making state enterprises and the negative trade balance of import-substituting 
industries increased the external debt. When droughts, decreasing remittances, and an 
increasing dollar price exacerbated the debt crisis and austerity measures provoked 
public rioting, Bourguiba was finally dispossessed in 1987.  
The incoming president Ben Ali recognized the need to create new 
employmentopportunities in order to absorb the country’s growing workforce and 
maintainsocio-political stability. The crisis had consolidated a consensus among the 
‘inner circle elites’ that economicdevelopment should be achieved through market 
forces rather than state planning. Ben Aliincreasingly brought technocrats into leading 
positions who would have the expertise to manage the necessary transition, but who 
were also loyalfollowers.In the absence of easily extractable natural resources, the 
future was seen in increasing the insertion in European value chains. Industrial policies 
reallocated resources from import-substitutingproduction to export industriesas well as 
the foreign exchange earning service, mainly tourism. The domestic market was 
increasingly liberalized, and most ‘strategic’ sectors were opened for privatization, 
including transport, energy,telecoms and banks. WTO accession and agreements with 
the European Union (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995; Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreement in 1996) made economic liberalization virtually irreversible, 
enhancing the legal security of private investors. In parallel, an ambitious export 
industry upgrading programme—the programme de mise à niveau—was launched. To 
date, about 4,400 enterprises have received consultancies and financial support to 
enhance their productivity. In 2009, manufacturing accounted for 75.4 per cent of 
exports (up from 36 per cent in 1980).    18
Tunisia’s industrial transition is a remarkable success story, especially when compared 
with the slow increase of manufacturing competitiveness in most other Maghreb and 
Mashriq countries. Although the national transformation project of export-led 
industrialization was implemented under authoritarian rule, it was not only about 
shifting from an agrarian to an industrial society; it also changed the composition of the 
elites, with increasing power of private entrepreneurs and technocrats; it created a broad 
urban middle class; and it changed the pattern of economic governance, from informal 
to increasingly rules-based decision-making. Political liberalization, however, did not 
keep up with the economic transformation. Also, jobs could not be created at the pace 
necessary to employ the rapidly growing workforce and conform to the social 
aspirations of the emerging middle classs. Public discontent with the economic situation 
and political repression led to a revolution in early 2011.  
4 Conclusions 
Latecomer countries face more severe market failure than mature market economies. 
Many of them still have to create a societal consensus on the need for industrial 
transformation and diversification; they need to encourage entrepreneurship and 
economic experimentation; nurture a nascent national entrepreneurial class; invest in 
skills development at all levels; set up regulatory institutions and quality assurance 
systems; and develop many other aspects that investors can already build on in 
established market economies. It is difficult to imagine how latecomers should be able 
to build new and internationally competitive industries unless their governments adopt 
pro-active policies to tackle some of the most problematic development constraints in a 
coordinated way. With limited state resources, such activities necessarily have to focus 
on the most binding constraints in the most promising sectors. 
At the same time, our case studies corroborate the pervasiveness of neopatrimonialism 
in industrial policy-making. The risks of making industry-specific choices under these 
circumstances are well-known. Where decision-making is informal and personalized, 
where institutional checks and balances are weak and the whole political systems is 
built on granting favours in exchange for loyalty, political capture is unavoidable. Lack 
of enforceable property rights creates uncertainty and thereby discourages private 
investments. Innovation is held back, because the alliance between governments and 
incumbent economic elites discourages competition with outsiders, and engaging in 
rent-seeking is often more lucrative for incumbents than concentrating on productive 
investments. Also, clientelism in the assignment of public employment runs counter to 
the principles of a meritocratic civil service, thereby reducing the effectiveness of policy 
implementation. In fact, the case studies confirm the pervasiveness of anti-competitive 
alliances between government and economic elites as well as principal agent problems 
leading to ineffective policy implementation.  
While these observations confirm conventional wisdom, two remarkable research 
findings call for a more differentiated consideration of the effects of neopatrimonialism. 
First, all of the seven economies considered attract substantial, and generally increasing, 
private investments and achieved considerable economic growth—ranging from 4.3 per 
cent (Syria) to 7.9 per cent (Ethiopia) annually in the 2000–08 period. Many investors 
have obviously not been scared away by the informality of policy-making and limited 
enforceability of contracts, suggesting that it is possible to make arrangements with the 
authorities that provide sufficient investment guarantee. This is perfectly rational,   19
because patron-client relations usually imply mutual commitments; politicians provide 
investment guarantees in exchange for political support or job-creating investments that 
help to enhance their legitimacy. In Egypt, Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2010) found that 
informal ‘growth alliances’ between policy makers and specific groups of investors in 
fact lowered barriers to investment. In the same vein, clientelism and patronage may 
strengthen social ties in larger groups and thereby facilitate collective action among 
firms. In the Arab world, the term wasta (‘favouritism’) therefore has a partly positive 
connotation.15 By definition, these arrangements are exclusive and therefore neither fair 
nor very efficient in terms of stimulating innovation, but the interesting finding is that 
they may still be able to bring about private sector-led economic growth.  
Second, while the concentration of political power in the hands of strong presidents with 
considerable discretionary power may stimulate nepotism and corruption, the cases of 
Tunisia and Ethiopia suggest that this does not rule out the possibility of rulers pursuing 
ambitious projects of productive transformation. On the contrary, a neopatrimonial 
leader may need to make fewer compromises than a government in a mature democracy 
with complex political checks and balances, and thus be better able to organize big 
targeted investment programmes or to grant lavish subsidies to industry upgrading 
programmes for the existing economic elites. The fact that power is exercised in a 
personalized way further increases the scope of political leaders for engaging in 
arm’slength relations with key investors; e.g. to negotiate tailor-made subsidies for 
particular strategically relevant investors and to demand their moral commitment to 
actively support the governments’ development programmes. 
More research is needed to understand why someneopatrimonial leaders, in Leftwich 
(2009) terms, become ‘developmental’ and create growth coalitions with the private 
sector, whereas others become ‘predatory or collusive’. Our country case studies point 
to three important interrelated determinants: 
1.  The  endowment with easily extractable natural resources seems to be one 
important determinant. The fact that the governments of countries with high oil, 
gas or mineral resource rents—Nigeria, Egypt, Syria16—do not seem to be as 
highly committed to a national project of productive transformation as those in 
resource-poor Tunisia and Ethiopia supports the resource curse hypothesis. 
Governments in resource-poor countries have only few patronage resources at 
their disposal and therefore need to offer a convincing perspective of economic 
growth that benefits the population at large in order to ensure their legitimacy. 
Rents need to be created through productive sectors before they can be 
distributed.  
2.  The ruler’s time horizon seems to be another differentiating factor. As Olson 
(1993) analysed in his seminal paper on dictatorship, democracy, and 
development, purely self-interested rulers would have an incentive to 
immediately extract as many rents as possible if they assumed their tenure to be 
short. When they expect a long tenure, in contrast, they have more incentives to 
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invest in economic development that would pay off in future rents and 
simultaneously buy political support from the electorate. The long reign of 
authoritarian rulers Ben Ali in Tunisia (1987-2011) and Meles Zenawi in 
Ethiopia (since 1995) enabled them to invest in long-term transformation 
projects that would inevitably take more than a decade to materialize in 
economic growth—such as the creation of a new system of technical universities 
and vocational training almost from scratch in Ethiopia, and the creation of a 
new export-oriented light manufacturing industry complex in Tunisia. Both 
presidents pushed their projects with an explicit long-term perspective in mind, 
and both started from a position of authoritarian rulership that was (with the 
exception of Ethiopia’s 2005 election) never seriously challenged by electoral 
competition. Nigeria is a counter-example, where presidential terms have been 
much shorter and no societal agreement on national transformation strategies 
was achieved. It should be noted, however, that long tenures by no means 
guarantee developmental attitudes of the rulers, as the large number of long-
lasting predatory regimes in the region shows.  
3.  Hence, the intrinsic development orientation of the national leadership makes a 
big difference. The assumption of purely self-interested surplus-extracting 
leaders (Olson 1993: 574) makes for analytical purposes is obviously simplistic, 
as he himself recognizes. In practice, individuals act out of very different 
motives. Political leaders are, to different degrees, also guided by values and 
convictions that include elements of altruism, nationalist convictions and are 
influenced by the predominant development ideas of their times. As shown for 
the example of Ethiopia, different ideological components can be traced back to 
specific historical lessons and international role models that impressed the top 
leadership.  
The above factors are highly interrelated and dependent on a many other context 
variables. The case studies point out, however, that the political convictions of the 
presidents and the top leadership as well as the way they seek to create legitimacy and 
secure their power are key determinants of the quality of industrial policy-making and 
explain more of the country variation than structural characteristics of the economy or 
the administration. This is why a thorough understanding of the political logic of 
neopatrimonialism and its local specific manifestations are important to predict whether 
and how industrial policy may function.  
At the same time, it needs to be stressed that an enlightened, developmental leadership 
that is not subject to political checks and balances provides a fragile basis for 
sustainable development. As Kelsall et al. point out, developmental experiments were 
not sustained in any of the African cases they studied, and they raise the question ‘to 
what extent degeneration is an evitable consequence’ (Kelsall et al. 2010: 27) of a 
model that encourages rent-seeking and lacks institutionalized controls. The recent 
revolutions in Arab countries confirm the latent instability of authoritarian regimes, 
even when they have been able to manage a fairly successful economic transition, as in 
the case of Tunisia. 
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